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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. SLANDER FALLS OUTSIDE SCOPE OF ExcLusIvE REMEDY PROVISION
In Loges v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
unanimously held that actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and assault and battery fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provision
of the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Act,2 but that an action for
slander does not.' This opinion is a culmination of many fragmented
decisions in worker's compensation law. The court attempted to harmonize
its previous holdings and to create a workable standard to determine what
actions fall within the worker's compensation exclusive remedy provision.
The appellant, Tina Loges, sued her employer Mack Trucks, Inc. ("Mack
Trucks"), and a co-employee, Steven T. Grove, alleging negligent supervision,
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and slander
The complaint alleged that during their employment with Mack Trucks, Grove
sexually harassed Loges both on the work premises and while traveling to and
from work.5  The parties stipulated that Loges routinely reported these
incidents to management, that Mack Trucks assured her that disciplinary action
would be taken, and that her supervisors issued verbal and written warnings
to Grove.6 Mack Trucks moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff had an exclusive remedy for her causes of action under the South
Carolina Worker's Compensation Act.7 The trial court granted the motion
1. __ S.C. _, 417 S.E.2d 538 (1992).
2. Id. at __, 417 S.E.2d at 540. The exclusive remedy provision states in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept
compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all
other rights and remedies of such employee... as against his employer, at common
law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
3. Loges, _ S.C. at __, 417 S.E.2d at 540.
4. Id. at , 417 S.E.2d at 539.
5. Id. at , 417 S.E.2d at 539. The court describes the incidents of harassment in the
complaint as follows:
The complaint allege[d] that on various occasions Grove publicly called [Loges]
a slut, bitch, whore; accused her of committing adultery and of having contracted
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS); that Grove used his car in an
attempt to run her car off the road, threw hardware at her, physically pushed her, and
anonymously sent flowers to her on Valentine's Day, then denied doing so.
Id. at __, 417 S.E.2d at 539.
6. Id. at , 417 S.E.2d at 539.
7. Id. at , 417 S.E.2d at 539-40. Mack Trucks further argued that summary judgment
was appropriate because no cause of action for negligent supervision exists in South Carolina.
Brief of Respondent at 1. The court did not address this contention because it disposed of the
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and dismissed Loges's complaint.' The supreme court affirmed, excepting the
slander allegation, which it reasoned was not barred by the Act's exclusivity
provision.9
The supreme court determined that the exclusive remedy of the Worker's
Compensation .Act absorbs a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, yet allows a separate slander action.' 0 The court explained that the
worker's compensation remedy is only exclusive with regard to personal
injuries." Relying on its decision in Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc.,12 the
court concluded that because slander is an injury to reputation and not a
personal injury, the Act's exclusivity provision does not bar the slander
action. 13 The court qualified this distinction, asserting that emotional injuries
accompanying slander are necessarily personal injuries and, therefore, are
subsumed by the exclusivity provision.'
4
Assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are
personal injuries within the scope of the Worker's Compensation Act."5
Relying on Doe v. South Carolina State Hospital,16 the court determined that
no physical manifestation is required to bring an injury within the ambit of the
exclusivity provision.17  The court distinguished the Doe ruling from its
previous decision in Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co.,' 8 upon which Loges
relied.' 9 The Stewart decision seemed problematic because it held that the
plaintiff could bring a common law action against her supervisor for willful
and malicious physical assault and was not limited to the worker's compensa-
motion under the terms of the Act's exclusivity provision.
8. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 539.
9. Id. at _,417 S.E.2d at 541.
10. Id. at 417 S.E.2d at 540.
11. Id. at 417 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Doe v. South Carolina State Hosp., 285 S.C. 183,
186, 328 S.E.2d 652, 654 (Ct. App. 1985)).
12. 306 S.C. 287, 411 S.E.2d 437 (1991).
13. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 540.
14. Id. at , 417 S.E.2d at 540; see infra text accompanying notes 15-22.
15. Id. at __, 417 S.E.2d at 540; see also Powell v. Vulcan Materials Co., 299 S.C. 325,
384 S.E.2d 725 (1989) (holding that mental injury is compensable under the Worker's
Compensation Act if incident to unusual and extraordinary conditions of employment); Stokes v.
First Nat'l Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 377 S.E.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that mental injury
suffered as a result of nonphysical stress incident to unusual and extraordinary conditions in
employment is compensable), aft'd, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991).
16. 285 S.C. 183, 328 S.E.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1985).
17. Loges, _ S.C. at, 417 S.E.2d at 540; accord Powell, 299 S.C. at 328, 384 S.E.2d
at 726; Stokes, 298 S.C. at 21, 377 S.E.2d at 926.
18. 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940). The court stated that "[a] distinction must be drawn
between injury excluded under the fundamental coverage provisions of the Act and injury which
is covered but for which, under the facts of the particular case, no compensation is payable."
Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 540.
19. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 540.
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tion exclusive remedy, in part, because her injury had no physical manifesta-
tion.20  However, in Thompson v. J.A. Jones Construction Co. 21 the court
confined Stewart to its facts and implicitly rejected the notion that absent a
physical manifestation, a plaintiff will have a common law action against the
employer.' Therefore, after Thompson the court could determine that
Loges's emotional injuries fell within the Act without physical disability on her
part.
The court then analyzed whether Loges's injury comported with the
statutory requirement that it arise out of and in the course of employment.
3
Relying on Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co. 124 the court found that
because Loges informed Mack Trucks of her problem with Grove and because
Mack Trucks failed to provide adequate relief or protection, the injury
necessarily arose out of the plaintiffs employment.' The court noted that
"[a]ppellant cannot argue that her employer failed to provide protection and
yet maintain that her injury did not arise out of employment.'26 Consequent-
ly, Loges's allegation that Mack Trucks' inadequate employee supervision
caused her to suffer damages flowing from intentional infliction of emotional
distress conflicted with her claim that her injury did not arise out of her
employment.27 The court also determined that Loges's injury arose
in the course of employment, a term which "refers to the time, place and
circumstances under which the accident occurs." 2s The court efficiently
disposed of this issue by noting that the record clearly showed the bulk of
Grove's harassing conduct occurred on the employer's premises.29
20. Stewart, 194 S.C. at 55-56, 9 S.E.2d at 37. The Stewart court stated:
To say that an intentional and malicious assault and battery by an employer on an
employee is such an accident is a travesty on the use of the English language; and the
travesty becomes the more pronounced when it is argued that the employee is
restricted for his recovery to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
although no physical disability, which alone entitles him to compensation under the
Act has been suffered. Such construction gives to the employer who committed the
assault and battery complete immunity for his offense, because it deprives the
employee of his right of action at common law.
Id.
21. 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226 (1942).
22. Id. at 313, 19 S.E.2d at 230, cited in Loges, - S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 540.
23. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 540-41; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (Law.
Co-op. 1985) ("'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment .... ).
24. 261 S.C. 341, 200 S.E.2d 64 (1973).
25. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 541.
26. Id. at 417 S.E.2d at 541.
27. Id. at 417 S.E.2d at 541.
28. Id. at 417 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Eargle v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 205 S.C.
423, 32 S.E.2d 240 (1944)).
29. Id. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 540.
1993]
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Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
Loges's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and
battery because these injuries fell within the scope of the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act.3" The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the slander
issue because slander is not a personal injury under the Act.3
Over the past three years the South Carolina courts have decided several
cases construing the breadth of the Worker's Compensation Act's exclusive
remedy provision; more specifically, the courts have analyzed its application
to employees' common law actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against employers and co-employees. McSwain v. Shei32 was the first
modem case to construe the worker's compensation exclusivity provision as
it relates to an employee's action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Marie McSwain alleged that her employer forced her to perform
certain physical exercises on the job that he knew would aggravate an
embarrassing bladder problem.33 While the court recognized that McSwain
satisfied the four elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 34 it clearly held that McSwain's action was outside the scope of the
exclusivity provision because her injury was intentional, not accidental.3 5
The court noted that "[t]he exception to the exclusivity provision is based upon
the nature of the act that caused the injury-whether it was intentional or
accidental. Only injuries caused by an 'accident' are within the jurisdiction
of the Commission. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is not an
'accident.'" 36 The court apparently based its conclusion-that employers who
deliberately harm employees may not assert the worker's compensation
30. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 541.
31. Id. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 541.
32. 304 S.C. 25, 402 S.E.2d 890 (1991) (holding that the Worker's Compensation Act did
not bar an employee from bringing an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against
the employer).
33. Id. at 27, 402 S.E.2d at 891.
34. Id. at 28-29, 402 S.E.2d at 891-92. The four elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are as follows:
(1) [t]he defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or
was certain or substantially certain that such distress would result from his conduct;
(2) the conduct was so 'extreme and outrageous' as to exceed 'all possible bounds of
decency' and must be regarded as 'atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community;' (3) the actions of defendant caused the plaintiff's emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was 'severe' so that 'no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it.'
Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 162, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting
Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154 (Me. 1979)), quoted in McSwain, 304
S.C. at 28, 402 S.E.2d at 891.
35. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 31, 402 S.E.2d at 893.
36. Id. at 29, 402 S.E.2d at 892. (citing 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 68.11 (1993)).
[Vol. 45
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/17
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
exclusivity provision as a bar to the employees' common law actions against
them-upon public policy considerations because this conclusion was
unsupported by precedent.37
The court finally noted that McSwain suffered emotional distress and
physical injury. Precedent mandated that an injury with a physical manifesta-
tion is a "personal injury" which brings an employee's remedy within the
worker's compensation exclusivity provision.38 However, the court rejected
this view, explaining "that the focus of the inquiry should be on the intentional
and outrageous nature of the act rather than the resulting injuries. ""
The Loges holding contrasts starkly with McSwain. The court determined
that Loges's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fell within the
exclusive remedy doctrine, even though the injury was deliberately imposed
and no physical manifestation accompanied the injury.4 The inconsistencies
are apparent; the court follows the same line of reasoning in each case, but
reaches contrary results. In McSwain the court proclaimed that employers
should not be permitted to use the worker's compensation remedial statute to
shield themselves from liability for their intentional wrongs.4" Why should
the strong policy reasons behind this holding fail to apply to a co-employee
who engages in equally culpable conduct? Why is a co-employee's intentional
injury an "accident" in the workplace when the same act committed by the
employer is not?42
37. The court summarized its reasoning by declaring, "we do not believe that the compensa-
tion laws were enacted to protect an employer where he deliberately and intentionally inflicts such
outrageous action upon an employee to cause him emotional distress." Id. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at
892. Arguably, the Stewart decision resulted in a similar holding. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. However, McSwain claimed physical assault. Stewart claimed purely mental
injury. Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
38. "Where there are physical injuries, any accompanying mental injuries resulting from the
same accident may not be segregated in an attempt to render the Act non-exclusive with respect
to the mental stress." Doe v. South Carolina State Hosp., 285 S.C. 183, 190, 328 S.E.2d 652,
656 (Ct. App. 1985); cf. Skipper v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 271 S.C. 152, 246 S.E.2d
94 (1978) (finding that a physical assault by a supervisor upon an employee rendered moot the
claim that the employee suffered mental injury resulting solely from mental stimuli).
39. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at 892. Perhaps the court shed more light on its
reasoning in Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc., 306 S.C. 287, 411 S.E.2d 437 (1991). Although
Dockins involved a slander action, the rationale seems to apply here. The court stated that "'to
block the main thrust of this action because of peripheral items of damage, when a compensation
claim could not purport to give relief for the ... injury to the reputation, would be incongruous,
and outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness clause.'" Id. at 288, 411 S.E.2d at 438
(quoting Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 413 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Mass. 1980)). Neither court defined
this "obvious intent."
40. Loges, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 541.
41. McSwain, 304 S.C. at 30, 402 S.E.2d at 892; see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying
text.
42. Granted, an injury inflicted upon an employee by a co-employee may be accidental and
1993]
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina has now addressed these questions.
When this article was first drafted, immediately following the Loges opinion,
Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. had been recently decided by the
court of appeals. 43  The court of appeals held that Dickert,, the"planiff
employee, could not maintain a common law action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress against her employer and supervisor.' Dickert alleged
that she suffered the verbal, physical and emotional harassment of her
supervisor.45 The only distinction the Dickert court drew between its
decision and McSwain is that in the latter the employer deliberately inflicted
the injury, whereas in Dickert, the supervisor (a fellow employee) committed
the wrongful acts.46  The court of appeals reasoned that this distinction
rendered McSwain inapplicable; consequently barring Dickert's common law
claims.47 The court's cursory analysis of this distinction was unconvincing
and unsatisfactory.
The South Carolina Supreme Court resolved the illogical employ-
er/employee distinction in favor of the arguments set forth herein.4" The
supreme court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals "to the extent it
holds Co-Employee is absolved of personal liability for his intentional tortious
acts committed while in the scope of employment."' 9 The Dickert court
stated that "a co-employee who negligently injures another employee while
in the scope of employment is immune under the Act and cannot be held
personally liable."50 However, the court held that "it is against public policy
unexpected from the employer's perspective, thereby allowing the Act to subsume the employee's
cause of action against the employer. However, that same injury is not accidental from te
offending co-employee's perspective. Forcing the injured employee to take only the worker's
compensation remedy, while allowing the offender to escape personal liability, seems patently at
odds with public policy and the court's own rationale in McSwain.
43. 306 S.C. 311, 411 S.E.2d 672 (Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, _ S.C., 428 S.E.2d 700 (1993).
44. Id. at 319,411 S.E.2d at 676. Dickert asserted causes of action against her employer for
negligence, breach of contract, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
invasion of privacy. She brought actions against her supervisor for assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 314, 411 S.E.2d at
674.
45. Id. at 314, 411 S.E.2d at 673. The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor subjected her to
"loud and threatening criticism of her performance, criticism of her personal appearance,
pounding and kicking her desk, shaking his fist at her in a threatening manner, throwing pens at
her, and hitting her with a rate book." Id. at 314, 411 S.E.2d at 673-74.
46. Id. at 322, 411 S.E.2d at 678.
47. Id.
48. Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,__ S.C. _, 428 S.E.2d 700 (1993).
49. Id. at _, 428 S.E.2d at 702.
50. Id. at-, 428 S.E.2d at 702; see also Powers v. Powers, 239 S.C. 423, 123 S.E.2d 646
(1962).
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to extend this immunity to the co-employee who commits an intentional
tortious act upon another employee." 5'
Essentially, the South Carolina courts have determined that an employer
may niot use the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation
Act to protect itself from liability for the 'intentional infliction of emotional
distress upon its employee. The Supreme Court of South Carolina resolved
the ambiguity surrounding the applicability of the exclusivity provision to
claims against a co-employee. In Dickert the court allowed a common law
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a fellow employee
because the Act's exclusivity provision should not bar the action as a matter
of public policy. Much to the bar's relief, the court has restored order to the
previously chaotic treatment of the South.Carolina Worker's Compensation
Act's exclusive remedy provision.
Ginger D. Goforth
51. Dickert, __ S.C. at _, 428 S.E.2d at 702.
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